Abstract-This paper describes an automated, distributed approach to controlling, operating, and managing electric power within a microgrid. Operation in the context of an external primary power grid is considered. We wish to construct a system that will allow us to state and enforce an energy policy that captures what we want the system to do under various conditions, including light and full duty cycles with and without grid connection, power failure, communication blackout, and other unexpected circumstances. We outline the duties required of a set of distributed decision-making entities given the task of managing the system, in particular as the system transitions from connected to local operation, and discuss several algorithms useful in this context. We also discuss the nature of the information structure needed to record operational policy.
II. INTRODUCTION
his paper describes an automated, distributed approach to controlling, operating, and managing electric power within a microgrid 1 . Henceforth we differentiate between the power system itself (PS) and the management, operation, and control system (MOCS), which consists of the computers, interfaces, information repositories, and communication devices needed to operate the power system. The PS and MOCS together are "the system."
The successful microgrid system will be:
• Localizable: power transported into the Microgrid over interruptible pathways may be interrupted with or without notice; • Distributed, rather than centralized, to reduce the likelihood of single-point failures; and • Automated to a greater degree than is currently practiced. Automation is required because human operators of distributed systems often have difficulty determining and pursuing a coherent course of action, especially when unexpected conditions are evolving rapidly. In large part this stems from inadequate situation awareness and an inability to communicate effectively. Wollenberg points out [1] that in contingency situations "the operator is usually at a complete loss to know what is happening because events take place so fast." Under such conditions, it is difficult for non-collocated human operators to cooperate because the duration of the decisionmaking cycle greatly exceeds the pace of events. This would be the case, for example, if connectivity to the primary grid were suddenly threatened.
It's also true that microgrids need to be automated if they are to be widely used. The U.S. currently operates around 16,000 generators with about a million megawatts of capacity. Replacing one percent of these with microsources would require about 50,000 200kw generators. If microsources are going to make a significant contribution, they will need to be automated.
Distribution is invoked specifically to enhance reliability; we cannot tolerate a system that won't function when access to the control center is denied. We want a MOCS made up of individual low-level controllers who act appropriately in response to local contingencies and cooperate with one another to achieve broader goals when circumstances demand and time permits.
The system should be automated in the following sense: human decisionmakers specify the desired system state under various conditions and the system attempts to achieve the desired states when it detects the stated conditions. This statement of circumstance-dependant desirable states-"If we're not going to make enough power with our own sources, start trying to buy power at a good price", e.g.-is the system policy. Policy should address, among other conditions, light and full duty with and without communication, grid connection, and source failure.
In this paper we outline the duties required of a set of distributed decision-making entities managing a microgrid system according to policy, in particular as the system transitions from connected to local operation, and discuss several algorithms useful in this context. We also discuss the nature of the operational policy information structure.
III. MICROGRID OPERATION
Microgrid operation, as in any power system, centers on power production and distribution 2 . Overall, it's easy to say what we want: The system should supply the loads for which it's responsible. In practice, however, the best we can hope for is that the system will act to supply its loads. This will often be sufficient because the PS will usually respond as the MOCS expects.
Firestone and Marnay state in [2] that "Microgrids require control … to make dispatch decisions that achieve system objectives such as cost minimization, reliability, efficiency and emissions requirements, while abiding by system constraints and regulatory rules."
The essential implication is that the MOCS have expectations. Further, the MOCS must be able to sense whether its expectations are consistent with reality and respond accordingly.
In order to have expectations, the MOCS must maintain a model of the PS. This model is used to estimate values for relevant system parameters as needed by policy by running it into the future starting at current condition. These future values are the MOCS's expectation of how the PS should behave. The model should be constructed to supply the values of the preconditions named in the MOCS's policy statements. Sensing and computational resources are needed to enable the MOCS to determine which (if any) policy preconditions apply at any given moment. In addition, the MOCS must be able to command elements of the PS based on the demands of the policy statement postconditions. This will require data structures containing the information needed to access PS effectors electronically, the information needed to determine which, if any, policy preconditions are met, the algorithms needed to achive the appropriate policy postconditions, and the executeable form of the commands needed to alter the behavior of the PS elements specified in the policy postconditions.
For example, consider the policy statement: "When load is expected to exceed the amount of power that can be produced by the operating sources at their current setpoints, and the setpoints of at least some sources are not at their maxima, raise the setpoints of the appropriate sources to the appropriate levels in an economically optimum manner." This implies that the MOCS needs to maintain data structures containing up-todate information about:
1. Which sources are operating and which are not, their electronic addresses, their current setpoints, their current production levels, their maximum production levels, and their production increase rates; 2. Current demand, its rate of increase, and its expected value at future points; 3. The algorithms to use to determine which sources will have their setpoints increased and the new levels; 4. The commands to be executed to enable these setpoint increases; and 5. The connectivity and interfaces needed to execute these commands within the PS. Each policy statement to be upheld by the system requires similar analysis. The MOCS will require a data structure containing the results of this policy analysis.
A. Assignment of responsibility to decisionmaking entities
Following [3] , the primary unit of responsibility is the cell: A set of sources, loads 3 , switches, branches, and buses managed by a single entity. The idea behind a cell is to attach an ontological element-the cell-to the smallest unit of responsibility. Cell extent is limited so that operating a cell under ordinary conditions is straightforward, consisting essentially of maintaining adequate power for the loads that "belong" to the cell. A cell should be conceptually simple and arranged so a single "tactical monitoring and control" entity can manage it easily; e.g., with sources physically collocated and all on one bus and with loads switched en masse as either "critical" or "non-critical".
For instance, a cell might consist of a building, the three generators in its basement, and the photovoltaic array and storage batteries on its roof and an additional building sharing power but with no generating capacity.
A group of cells whose management entities all follow the same policy constitutes a cooperative or co-op. The existence of a co-op depends on the policy the management entities are following. The point of defining the co-op is to label the group of cells for which it is desirable to design a common policy. For instance, we might want a cell to supply the hospital in a neighboring cell at a higher priority than its own movie theater. This would require policy statements defining the conditions under which this was to occur, along with the appropriate branches, relays, switches, and sensors.
B. Microgrid operation under expected conditions
We would like the system to operate efficiently when conditions are as expected. It has been argued that most contingencies, e.g. power outages, are common and should therefore be "expected", but we characterize these as anticipated, to enable the development of responses to them, and reserve expected for situations we forecast based on the current state.
If the system state were steady, we would arrange system settings-generator setpoints, e.g.-as desired and let the system run, but we know from experience that even when a relatively "steady state" can be achieved, it will not be for long. The MOCS needs to determine its actions based on the difference between what it thinks the future state will be and what it would like the future state to be. Under expected desirable conditions, this should be based on efficiency.
The function of the MOCS under expected conditions, then, is to determine which sources should produce power and how much they should produce. This function is called dispatch. Ordinarily, we want economic dispatch. There are many algorithms for dispatch, for example those found in [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] , and [11] . These algorithms are decentralized, that is, the necessary computations can be performed by several computers that do not need to share data synchronously, although communication is required.
Expected conditions are not always desirable, for instance when available sources will not be able to produce enough power for forecast demand. The MOCS should be prepared to shed load as needed using an approach like those found in [8] and [10] . The methodology of [10] is attractive because it "utilizes an internal model to predict system dynamic behavior over a finite horizon. Control decisions are based on optimizing that predicted response."
In [12] , Dimeas and Hatziargriou discuss a market-based cycle operated by a Microgrid Central Controller that enables the microgrid to be "managed and coordinated efficiently." The cycle (modified to fit this discussion):
1. A market operator announces the prices for selling and buying energy to the Microgrid. 2. Local loads announce their demands for the next cycle period and an initial price per kWh. 3. Power sources accept or decline the load offer according to an algorithm-derived Auction Price (AP). 4. After a specific negotiation period, all sources will have adjusted their set points. If no production unit within the Microgrid will satisfy the load demand, power is bought from the grid. The primary grid can also be considered as a load, and the microgrid can sell energy to the primary grid. The decisionmaking entities in [12] are "driven by a set of tendencies. For a battery system a tendency could be: 'charge the batteries when the price for the kWh is low and the state of charge is low, too.'" This is an example of operational policy dealing with storage.
As microgrid policy writers, we will include statements such as "Maintain service to all loads", "When load must be shed, shed non-critical loads before critical loads", and "If it appears that total load will at some future time exceed the maximum that the system can supply in its current configuration, search for other configurations in which the projected load can be satisfied." Policy statements such as these, put into operation, make a group of independent cells into a microgrid.
To frame a complete operational policy, myriad issues must be considered, including but not limited to load priority, interaction of microgrid power with external power, interaction with human operators, security (power security, cybersecurity, and system protection), system expansion, maintenance, source characteristics (wind and solar provide intermittent power, lead-acid batteries are ruined by deep discharge, etc.), and load characteristics (ensured power quality is one design reason to utilize microgrids). The desirable states are described and the condition of the controllable entities while in each state is characterized. This is normally difficult to complete because of the large equivalence class of system conditions able to produce a desirable system state (for example, many subsets of the available sources may able to produce the same total power).
C. Microgrid operation under unexpected conditions
When conditions are not what we expect, we would like the system, if possible, to meet at least our most pressing needs and return to a desirable state if it is not in one already. To do this, the MOCS will need to know (among many other things) which of our needs are most pressing, i.e., loads will need to be prioritized, and not just the current loads; the MOCS needs to predict power needs that it is likely be called upon to satisfy, when that might be in each case, and their priorities. Talukdar points out in [9] that "the survival of essential missions is a more tractable problem than the prevention of all large cascading failures, and its solutions are verifiable." This is particularly appropriate for the case where expected loads have been prioritized. An operational MOCS will need to accommodate various contingencies, for example the failure of a source to arrive at a set point by the end of the negotiation period in III A4 above. This is more difficult than maintaining normal conditions because of the many possible return paths.
Because inductance is relatively small in a microgrid, maintaining stability can be difficult. Voltage and frequency changes that would hardly be noticed in a regional power grid can initiate cascading failure in a microgrid. To some extent, however, we can ignore low-level instabilities caused by individual device behavior by relying on the "plug-and-play" sensing and logic capability described by Lasseter [13] , which enables a source to condition its power parameters relative to the primary circuit so that stability is maintained throughout connection, disconnection, and power level changes. It may also be necessary to condition source behaviors in concert so that sources do not interfere with one another, for instance by assigning different ramp rates to sources, even when using plug-and-play technology.
We must anticipate rapid voltage and frequency changes to which the system's only timely response can be to protect itself by shutting down sources and opening breakers. Contingencies of this sort are caused primarily by rapid changes in the power being generated relative to demand and are impossible to predict, because they are normally caused by unexpected events such as source failures and line breaks. Modern source control engineering can handle relatively slow unimodal changes in load, but fast fluctuations can cause instabilities that will cause protective shutdown of even "smart" plug-and-play sources and can lead to cascades.
No matter how carefully we condition individual source behavior, system policy must include controlled load shedding, amelioration of damaging events in progress, and system recovery and restoration. Designing system policy to address contingencies is supported by many approaches for detecting and dealing with problems, including [14] on using Flexible A/C Transmission Systems to damp oscillations; [15] on security analysis; [16] on vulnerability indices; [9] on mission continuation in the face of failure; [17] , [18] , and [19] on distributed adaptive relay setting to mitigate failure processes; [20] on microgrid blackstart and islanding, [21] on power system restoration, and [22] on reconfiguring for minimal out-of-service area. These sources are particularly relevant for microgrids because they describe on-line analysis, agents, and distributed algorithms.
D. Transition from expected to unexpected conditions
The situation changes from "expected" to "unexpected" when the PS state does not match, to a meaningful degree, the state that the MOCS has predicted it should be in. The central issue with this statement is the word "meaningful". Determination of what differences are meaningful is an engineering question that depends on the power system being managed. Adaptive determination of what level of mismatch is meaningful is an element of future work. In any case, the MOCS must quickly decide whether the "expectation failure" requires action on its part. In practice reduces to deciding whether any policy preconditions apply and executing the post conditions. Several policy statements may be applicable, and determining the order in which to apply the postconditions is another element of future work.
E. Transition to the islanded state
When primary grid instability and/or power condition threaten to cause protective response in the microgrid, the MOCS may wish to disconnect from its primary grid. Before disconnecting, the MOCS must determine the disparity between the power being generated within the island and the power being used, and decide on a response to the predicted disparity. If too much power is being generated, the MOCS needs to shut down and/or lower the setpoints of some generators; if not enough, the MOCS needs to shed some load. If the predicted primary grid disturbance will occur too soon to have time for this, it may be necessary to disconnect without proper condition, allow the protective response of the microgrid, then restore or blackstart (as in [20] ) as needed. The problem of how to split an operating grid into islands to best serve current loads with operating sources is addressed in [23] , [24] , and [25] , but each determines where to split the grid to best serve demand; we have the inverse problem: We know where to split the grid (i.e., at the microgrid boundary) and we need to know how to shed load or increase production so that the split will not cause the microgrid to go black. We must approach the problem as in [26] and decide when to split in the only place the split can occur and minimize the impact of the resulting disturbance.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Penetration of microgrids requires automation of their dayto-day operation. Advances is power control technology have enabled the essential connect-supply-shutdown-disconnect operations without significant higher-level concern. Still needed is the ability to decide which sources should be providing power and how the power system should be reconfigured to isolate faults, recover from upsets, restore itself to operation after primary failures, halt or slow cascading failure, and separate from the primary grid when blackout threatens. In addition, the system must respond to requests from humans. The means to accomplish these goals is a set of distributed computational management entities with the necessary information to make the appropriate operational decisions and the sensing and effecting mechanisms needed to carry them out.
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